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IV 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF, LAW WHEN 
IT GRANTED UDOTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED, 
AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN IT GRANTED SWEENEY'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
POINTI 
UDOPS STATEMENT OF FACTS IS NOT A STATEMENT OF FACTS BUT MERELY UDOT'S 
ASSERTIONS, WHICH ARE SPECIFICALLY DISPUTED BY THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. HENSHAW AND 
DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE RECORD. 
Contrary to UDOT's assertion, set forth on page 4 of its Brief, Mr. 
Henshaw never informed Sweeney that their was a problem with the "title" to 
the property. Mr. Henshaw merely informed Sweeney that he had been contacted 
by someone claiming that they owned a part of the property Sweeney was 
selling to him. Mr. Henshaw never stated there was a problem with the 
"title" to the property. Mr. Henshaw did not know if a problem existed with 
the title to the property; that is why he contacted Sweeney. (Record at 444-
445) 
UDOT's assertion contained on page 5 of its Brief, in which UDOT claims 
that it is a fact that Sweeney sent an alleged letter to Mr. Henshaw on 
October 9 or 10 of 1985, is likewise not a statement of fact. Mr. Henshaw 
specifically denies that he ever received any such letter, and Sweeney first 
stated, under oath, the letter was sent in 1991. The only thing Sweeney's 
Affidavit proves is that she will sign anything given to her by UDOT and will 
say anything UDOT wants her to say. 
Paragraph No. 2 of page 5 of UDOT's Brief, in which UDOT states: "UDOT 
satisfied Sweeney's complaint about the state of the title by purchasing back 
Sweeney's interest in the property by assignment on November 21, 1985," is 
not a statement of fact; it is UDOT's legal conclusion and opinion. 
UDOT's assertion, contained in paragraph 2, page 6, that Mr. Henshaw had 
actual and constructive knowledge of UDOT's involvement in "working out the 
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problems with the title" is not a statement of fact; it is, again, simply 
UDOT's opinion, speculation and conclusion. There is no evidence that Mr. 
Henshaw ever knew there was a problem with the title to the property or that 
UDOT was working to solve it. 
Paragraph 3, page 6, of UDOT's Brief is, also, legal argument. UDOT's 
contentions are not facts. They are merely UDOT's contentions, nothing more. 
UDOT's assertions contained in paragraph 2, page 7, of UDOT's Brief are 
not facts. They are merely UDOT's assertions. Those assertions are 
specifically disputed by Mr. Henshaw's Affidavit and the Exhibits attached 
thereto. (Record at 445-446) 
UDOT's assertion that it only became aware of Brady's interest in the 
property in 1991 is specifically disputed by Mr. Henshaw's Affidavit. While 
it is true that Mr. Henshaw did not file any Affidavits from Mrs. Brady or 
Luke Ong disputing those assertions. Such Affidavits, additional 
documentation and testimony would have been available but for UDOT's Summary 
Judgment Motion and the trial court's order precluding Mr. Henshaw from 
conducting any discovery. 
POMTII 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST IN THIS CASE WHICH PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT 
FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UDOT. 
Contrary to UDOT's assertion, there are many genuine issues of material 
fact present in this case which precluded the trial court from granting 
Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT. Those issues have been set forth in Mr. 
Henshaw's initial Appeal Brief and need not be repeated in this Brief. 
However, because there are genuine issued of material fact present in this 
matter, this Court must reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
UDOT and remand this matter to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 
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POINTIII 
ALL OF MR. HENSHAWS CAUSES OF ACTION STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MUST BE 
GRANTED. 
Contrary to UDOT's assertions, all of Mr. Henshaw's causes of action set 
forth in his Second Amended Complaint state a Claim upon which relief may be 
granted. Although, Mr. Henshaw agreed that his Third Cause of Action should 
be dismissed because he failed to file a notice with UDOT. That cause of 
action, as well as the other causes of action state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. However, Utah case law states that the failure to serve 
notice on UDOT deprives the courts of jurisdiction to hear the claim. 
Therefore, Mr. Henshaw stipulated that the Third Cause of Action should be 
dismissed. 
UDOT's assertion, contained in section B of Point II of its brief, 
claiming that Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action is barred by "Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993)" is nonsense. Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action is 
not a property claim, as asserted by UDOT. Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of 
Action is based on contract law, not property law. (Record at 311-313). 
UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action fails to 
state a cause of action because he had no right, of any kind, in the property 
is simply not true. Mr. Henshaw simply made an assignment of the Contract 
for purchase of the property to his parents as security for money lent to Mr. 
Henshaw by his parents. The assignment was never intended to be a conveyance 
of title to the property but merely a security device for his parents. 
The Real Estate Sales Contract between Sweeney and Mr. Henshaw 
(hereinafter, "the Contract") gave Mr. Henshaw the right of possession of the 
property. Nothing in the Assignment to his parents changed that right. 
Therefore, Mr. Henshaw had the right of possession of the property at the 
time UDOT permitted Salt Lake County to go on to Mr. Henshaw's property and 
cause the damage to the property. 
UDOT's assertion that it did nothing that could be construed as 
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breaching Mr. Henshaw's right of quiet enjoyment is specifically disputed by 
Mr. Henshaw. (Record at 455-456) Over Mr. Henshaw's protestations, UDOT's 
officials told Salt Lake County that Mr. Henshaw did not own the property and 
had no claim of any nature to the property and told the county workers and 
officials they could go on to the property to do whatever they wanted with 
the property. (Record at 455-456). 
At a minimum, there are genuine issues of material fact present which 
precluded the trial court from granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action. Therefore, the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action. Therefore, this Court must 
reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment and remand this case for 
trial. 
POWTIV 
UDOT'S ASSERTION THAT MR. HENSHAWS FIRST, SECOND AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FAIL 
TO STATE A CLAIM BECAUSE THEY WERE MERGED INTO THE WARRANTY DEED GIVEN TO MR. 
HENSHAW IN 1991 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY STATUTORY PROVISION, CASE LAW OR ANY 
OTHER AUTHORITY. 
In Section C of Point II of its Brief, UDOT again incorrectly asserts 
that Mr. Henshaw had no interest in the property. That statement is false. 
As set forth in Point II of this Brief, Mr. Henshaw simply made an assignment 
of the Contract for purchase of the property to his parents as security for 
money lent to Mr. Henshaw by his parents. The assignment was never intended 
to be a conveyance of title to the property but merely a security device for 
his parents. UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw had no interest in the 
property is simply not true. 
UDOT next makes the incredulous, hypocritical statement that Mr. Henshaw 
engaged in "a shocking breach of ethics in recording telephone conversations 
without first informing the other parties he was doing so." (UDOT's Brief 
pages 14-15) This unbelievable hypocritical statement is characteristic of 
UDOT's attitude in this case. It is not a breach of ethics for UDOT's 
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officials to lie in their affidavits or to attempt to coerce Mr. Henshaw into 
taking a quit claim deed to the property when UDOT officials knew that they 
could not convey clear title to the property, but it is a breach of ethics 
for Mr. Henshaw to catch them in their lies and to document those lies. 
To what code of ethics is UDOT referring that permits its officials to 
lie under oath but requires those lied to by UDOT officials to inform the 
lying officials in advance that if they lie they may be impeached at a later 
date by their lies. Obviously UDOT has a very strange code of ethics for its 
employees, and a very strange definition of ethics. 
Mr. Henshaw concedes that under certain circumstances prior 
negotiations, contracts and representations merge into a final contract or 
into a deed. However, there is no statute, case law or any other authority 
of any type that states, declares, suggests or even remotely implies that 
damages are merged into a contract. This was the argument made by UDOT to 
the trial court, which Judge Frederick rejected in denying UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment which Judge Lewis had under advisement for nearly two years. 
There is simply no authority, of any nature whatsoever, supporting 
UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw's prior damages merged into the August 1991 
Warranty Deed. Mr. Henshaw is not required to choose between retaining a 
claim for past damages and waiving any claim for future damages caused by his 
failure to mitigate his damages. Mr. Henshaw accepted the deed in order to 
mitigate his damages, but he did not accept it in satisfaction of his 
previous damages. 
UDOT's assertion that the August 1991 Warranty Deed constitutes an 
accord and satisfaction is also not supported by any authority. UDOT raises 
this defense for the first time on appeal and therefore, it is improper for 
this Court to even consider that claim. Smith v. Iversen, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah 
1993). Nonetheless, Mr. Henshaw will respond to that improper and untimely 
assertion. 
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As UDOT correctly states in its Brief, accord and satisfaction has 
certain distinct and required elements, i.e. 
1) proper subject matter; 
2) competent parties; 
3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties; and 
4) a consideration given for the accord. 
In the instant matter, UDOT cannot show that anything even remotely 
resembling an accord and satisfaction, with respect to Mr. Henshaw's prior 
damages was ever contemplated, much less negotiated, in conjunction with the 
delivery of the August 1991 Warranty Deed. There is no assertion by UDOT 
that discussion of prior damages sustained by Mr. Henshaw was ever discussed 
in conjunction with the preparation and delivery of the August 1991 Warranty 
Deed. There is no evidence that Mr. Henshaw ever agreed to accept the August 
1991 Warranty Deed in satisfaction of his prior damages. There is no 
evidence that UDOT gave Mr. Henshaw any consideration for the alleged accord 
and satisfaction. 
All UDOT gave Mr. Henshaw was a warranty deed. UDOT was required by 
contract to give Mr. Henshaw a warranty deed. Mr. Henshaw did not receive 
any consideration for his prior damages. There was no meeting of the minds 
and no accord and satisfaction. 
UDOT's assertion that it could not obtain title insurance on the 
property is also nonsense. UDOT asserts that it did not obtain title 
insurance in Mr. Henshawfs name because he failed to record the deed given to 
him by UDOT. That assertion is simply not true. UDOT could have obtained a 
seller's policy of title insurance before the conveyance of the Deed to Mr. 
Henshaw, and it could have obtained a buyer's policy of title insurance 
before the conveyance of the Deed to Mr. Henshaw, to become effective upon 
recordation of the Deed by Mr. Henshaw. 
By its own admission, UDOT never provided Mr. Henshaw with any type or 
form of title insurance, either before conveyance of the Warranty Deed or 
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after conveyance of the deed. The failure of UDOT to do so is a per se 
breach of the Contract with Mr. Henshaw. The trial court erred, as a matter 
of law in concluding that Mr. Henshawfs damages were merged in the August 
1991 Warranty Deed, if such conclusion was in fact made. That error is 
prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, the trial court's Order granting 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for 
trial on the merits. 
POINT V 
MR. HENSHAW'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
BECAUSE UDOT'S PURCHASE OF MR. HENSHAW'S CONTRACT WITH SWEENEY IS NOT A 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION. 
By no stretch of imagination can UDOT's purchase of the Real Estate 
Contract between Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney be construed to be a governmental 
function on the part of UDOT. UDOT's condemnation of Sweeney's property may 
have been a governmental function, but its purchase of the Real Estate 
Contract between Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney was not. 
UDOT improperly asserts to this Court that the repurchase of the Real 
Estate Contract was a governmental function required by the condemnation of 
other property belonging to Sweeney. That assertion is not true. UDOT was 
under no legal obligation to buy the Contract from Sweeney. UDOT had given 
Sweeney a Quit Claim Deed for the property, which Sweeney accepted. 
Therefore, Sweeney got the benefit of her bargain, and she took the property 
subject to all liens, encumbrances and defects in title. Sweeney only 
received as good of a title as UDOT had when it conveyed the property to 
Sweeney, and that was a title subject to the claims of Proctor and Brady. 
UDOT did not buy the Contract between Sweeney and Mr. Henshaw as part of 
any state project, state contract or state purpose. It is disingenuous for 
UDOT to claim that its purchase of the Contract between Mr. Henshaw and 
Sweeney was a "governmental function." Such an assertion is spurious at 
best. 
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In a footnote on page 21 of its Brief, UDOT asserts that Mr. Henshaw's 
Fifth Cause of Action was not pleaded with specificity as required by Rule 9 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. UDOT did not raise this claim in the 
trial court and, therefore, may not raise it for the first time on appeal. 
Smith v. Iversen, supra. Furthermore, UDOT never filed a motion for a more 
definite statement or objected in any way to Mr. Henshaw's Fifth Cause of 
Action. Therefore, UDOT has waived any alleged irregularities with respect 
to that cause of action. 
UDOT is not immune from suit due to its conspiracy to defraud Mr. 
Henshaw in connection with UDOT's purchase of the Contract from Sweeney. 
Therefore, UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Fifth Cause of Action fails to 
state a claim for relief, is totally without basis in fact or law and the 
trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the trial court's Order granting 
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for 
trial on the merits. 
POINT VI 
NONE OF MR. HENSHAW'S CAUSES OF ACTION ARE TIME BARRED. 
Of all of UDOT's assertions, its assertion that it succeeded to 
Sweeney's breach is the most bizarre. UDOT has not cited any statute, case 
law, treatises, or other authority, of any nature, type or description, which 
states, declares, suggests, or even remotely implies that an assignee of a 
contract succeeds to the assignor's breach of the contract. Such an 
assertion is mind boggling. If that were the law, scam artists could forever 
avoid liability by assigning contracts they had breached to a new person or 
entity until the statute of limitations had expired on the first breach and 
the aggrieved party would have no recourse against anyone. 
UDOT did not, and cannot, cite this Court to any case, statute or other 
authority supporting its assertion that a person who buys a contract that has 
been breached by the person selling the contract also buys the breach of the 
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seller. A person cannot breach a contract until he has an obligation to 
perform under that contract, and a person cannot breach that contract until 
he reuses to perform some obligation on the contract. 
UDOT had no obligation to convey Mr. Henshaw a warranty deed to the 
property, to provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance on the property or to 
accept Mr. HenshawTs payments on the property until Mr. Henshaw tendered UDOT 
payment on the property. Mr. Henshaw tendered his first payment to UDOT in 
March 1986. (Record at 452) Therefore, UDOT's breach occurred, at the 
earliest, in March of 1986, when UDOT first refused to accept Mr. Henshaw's 
payment. 
When Mr. Henshaw tendered payment to UDOT and UDOT refused to accept the 
payment, refused to convey the property to Mr. Henshaw by a warranty deed and 
refused to provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance, as required by the 
Contract, UDOT breached the Contract with Mr. Henshaw. UDOT did not breach 
the Contract when Sweeney first refused to accept payments from Mr. Henshaw. 
UDOT's breach of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing also 
occurred at the earliest in March 198 6, when Mr. Henshaw tendered payment to 
UDOT, and UDOT refused to accept the payment. UDOT did not have a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing until it became a party to the Contract. UDOT 
did not breach that covenant of good faith and fair dealing until it refused 
to accept Mr. Henshaw's payments. UDOT did not, and could not, succeed to 
Sweeney's breach of her covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Mr. 
Henshaw. 
UDOT continually asserts that Mr. Henshaw knew that Sweeney and/or her 
attorney were working with UDOT to resolve problems with the title to the 
property. That assertion is simply not true. Mr. Henshaw never stated that 
he had any knowledge that there were any problems with the title to the 
property. Mr. Henshaw only stated that Sweeney told him she was attempting 
to resolve some problems with the property. Mr. Henshaw never stated what 
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those problems were. Mr. Henshaw never stated or implied that Sweeney ever 
told him what the problems with the property were, only that there were 
problems. UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw knew that Sweeney was working 
with UDOT to solve problems with the title to the property is simply UDOT's 
own speculation, conjecture and conclusion, it is not supported by any 
evidence. 
UDOT further asserts that Mr. Henshaw had constructive and actual 
knowledge of the assignment of the Contract to UDOT from Sweeney. UDOT 
asserts that Mr. Henshaw knew or should have known that Sweeney had assigned 
the Contract to UDOT because Sweeney allegedly sent him a "memorandum" on or 
about October 10, 1985, stating that she was going to assign the Contract to 
UDOT. Mr. Henshaw specifically denies ever receiving any such Memorandum, 
which Sweeney first swears was sent in 1991, and UDOT never claims that it 
took any action prior to March of 198 6 to inform Mr. Henshaw that Sweeney 
assigned the Contract to UDOT. 
UDOT is asking this Court to hold, as a matter of law, that a buyer 
under a real estate contract is required to go to the county recorder's 
office every month, or more, to check if the seller has, unbeknownst to the 
buyer, assigned the contract to a third party. If there had been any 
manifest changes in circumstance or extrinsic signs that would have alerted 
Mr. Henshaw that the Contract had been assigned, then perhaps he would have 
had a duty to investigate. However, less than three months had lapsed 
between the assignment to UDOT and the time Mr. Henshaw received notice from 
UDOT of the assignment. During the interim, there was nothing that occurred 
to put Mr. Henshaw on any type of notice that any assignment of the Contract 
had taken place. Absent some extrinsic circumstances that would put a 
reasonable person on notice that he should check the county recorder's office 
to see if something had been filed affecting his property, Mr. Henshaw had no 
duty to inspect the county recorder's office between January 12, 1985, and 
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March 198 6, to ascertain whether Sweeney had assigned the Contract to UDOT. 
Mr. Henshaw simply had no actual or constructive knowledge of the assignment 
until March 1986. 
Furthermore, UDOT'S assertion that Mr. Henshaw knew or should have known 
that Sweeney had assigned the Contract to UDOT is irrelevant. UDOT did not 
breach the Contract, and could not breach the Contract until Mr. Henshaw 
tendered payment to UDOT. It is undisputed that Mr. Henshaw's first tender 
occurred in March of 198 6. Therefore, UDOT's breach first occurred in March 
of 1986, not July 1985, October 1985 or December 1985, as UDOT would have 
this Court believe. 
Because UDOT's breaches of Mr. Henshawfs First, Second and Fourth Causes 
of Action occurred in March 198 6, at the earliest, and are based on a written 
agreement, i.e., the Contract, the breaches are governed by a six-year 
statute of limitations that began to run no earlier than March 198 6. Mr. 
Henshaw filed his Complaint against UDOT on February 6, 1992, clearly within 
the six-year statute of limitation. Therefore, Mr. Henshawfs Complaint is 
not time barred. Because Mr. Henshawfs First, Second and Fourth Cause of 
Action are not bared by the statute of limitations, the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Therefore, the trial court's Order granting UDOT's Motion for 
Summary Judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for trial on the 
merits. 
POINT VII 
MR. HENSHAWS FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT TIME BARRED. 
Mr. Henshaw's cause of action for "Conspiracy to Defraud" is not time 
barred. Mr. Henshaw only learned upon receipt of UDOT's Answer to its 
Amended Complaint, received in May 1994, that UDOT was asserting that it 
never "transferred fee title" to Sweeney but rather that UDOT "deeded only a 
right of way to Sweeney." (UDOT's Answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended Complaint, 
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pages 2-3, 1 10; UDOT's Answer to Mr. Henshaw's Second Amended Complaint, 
page 7, f 37). (Record at 269-270, 342). Mr. Henshaw only learned of 
Brady's interest in the property in 1991. 
If, as UDOT asserts in its Answers to Mr. Henshaw's Complaints, UDOT 
only deeded a right-of-way to Sweeney, UDOT clearly knew it at the time it 
was insisting that Mr. Henshaw take a Quit Claim Deed and sign a release, 
absolving UDOT from all liability in connection with the property. 
Nonetheless, UDOT conspired to defraud Mr. Henshaw into taking a Quit Claim 
Deed rather than the Warranty Deed required by the Contract. UDOT knowingly, 
intentionally, willfully and maliciously attempted to defraud Mr. Henshaw by 
insisting that Mr. Henshaw take a Quit Claim Deed and signing a release, 
which would absolve UDOT of any liability on the Contract. Those actions on 
the part of UDOT constitute conspiracy to defraud. 
Mr. Henshaw only learned of UDOT's fraud from its answers filed in this 
matter in May and July 1994. Therefore, Mr. Henshaw's cause of action for 
Conspiracy to Defraud is not time barred by any statute of limitations. 
UDOT now asserts that it gave Sweeney a fee interest. However, UDOT 
never provided Mr. Henshaw with a copy of the alleged deed, and UDOT cannot 
contradict its own pleadings with subsequent affidavits. Therefore, there is 
a genuine issue of material fact as to what type of interest UDOT was 
attempting to coerce Mr. Henshaw into taking by means of a quit claim deed, 
and it is undisputed that Mr. Henshaw first learned of UDOT's assertion that 
Sweeney only was only given a right-of-way in May 1994. 
Consequently, UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Fifth Cause of Action is 
bared by the statute of limitations is totally without basis in fact or law, 
and the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it 
granted UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the trial court's 
Order granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment must be reversed and the 
case remanded for trial on the merits. 
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POINT VIII 
THE DATE OF SWEENEY'S BREACH OF HER CONTRACT WITH MR. HENSHAW IS IN DISPUTE. 
Contrary to Sweeney's assertion, there is a genuine factual dispute as 
to when Sweeney's breach of the Contract with Mr. Henshaw occurred. Sweeney 
asserts that it is undisputed that the breach occurred in July 1985. Neither 
Sweeney nor UDOT dispute the fact that Sweeney breached the Contract with Mr. 
Henshaw. They only claim the breach occurred in July 1985 rather than March 
1986. 
In support of her assertion that the breach occurred in July 1985, 
Sweeney asserts that Mr. Henshaw's affidavit states that the Breach in fact 
occurred in July 1985. In reality, what Mr. Henshaw's affidavit states is 
that beginning in July 1985, he began to negotiate with Sweeney for a payoff 
of the Contract and that he was trying to negotiate a reduced payoff price 
in return for early payment of the Contract. (Record at 114-115) It is 
undisputed that the Contract had not run its term. Because Sweeney was not 
obligated to accept a discounted payoff on the contract, her refusal to 
accept an offer of a discounted payoff in July 1985, does not constitute a 
breach of the Contract, as she now argues. 
Likewise, Sweeney was not obligated to accept an early payoff of the 
Contract. Therefore, her refusal in July 1985, to accept an early payoff 
does not constitute a breach of the Contract. 
It is also undisputed that Sweeney lead Mr. Henshaw to believe that she 
was attempting to resolve some unspecified problem with the property so that 
she could accept a final payoff and deliver Mr. Henshaw a warranty deed and 
title insurance, as the Contract requires. It is a further undisputed fact 
that Sweeney lead Mr. Henshaw to believe that she would accept payments or a 
final payment on the Contract once the unspecified problem with the property 
was resolved. (Record at 114-115A) Therefore, Sweeney's breach of the 
Contract did not occur until she conveyed the property to UDOT and UDOT 
recorded the assignment of the Contract, making it impossible for Sweeney to 
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perform under the Contract. The breach occurred at the earliest on December 
12, 1985. It is a general rule that a cause of action accrues upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action, not 
the first. Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981). Therefore, the 
trial court erred when it concluded that Sweeney1s breach of the Contract 
occurred in July 1985. That error is prejudicial and reversible. 
Consequently, the trial court's Order dismissing Mr. Henshaw's Complaint 
against Sweeney must be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
POINTIX 
SWEENEY IS CORRECT, THERE IS NO DISPUTE AS TO THE DATE OF MR. HENSHAWS CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR FRAUD. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Henshaw first learned that Sweeney did not 
have clear title to the property until 1991, when he learned of Brady's and 
Procter's interest in the property. (Record at 114-115A) Sweeney, however, 
asserts that Mr. Henshaw either knew or had reason to know that she did not 
have clear title to the property at an earlier date. Sweeney asserts that 
Mr. Henshaw could have simply examined the records at the county recorder's 
office and discovered that she did not have clear title to the property. 
Sweeney, however, ignores the fact that UDOT allegedly did not discover 
Brady's interest in the property from 1985 through 1991, a period of six 
years. (Record at 381) If UDOT could not find a problem with the property 
in six years, why is Mr. Henshaw held to a higher standard? Sweeney also 
chooses to ignore the fact that Mr. Henshaw had three title searches 
conducted on the property and none of those reports showed either Proctor's 
or Brady's interest in the property. If professional title companies could 
not find any cloud on the title to the property, how is Mr. Henshaw, an 
ordinary person, expected to do so, and why is he held to a higher standard 
than professional title companies? 
The undisputed facts are that Mr. Henshaw did not learn of Sweeney's 
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fraud until 1991. (Record at 115A) He filed his Complaint against Sweeney 
in 1992, clearly within the appropriate statute of limitations. Therefore, 
the trial court erred when it concluded that Mr. Henshaw's cause of action 
for fraud accrued in July 1985. That error is prejudicial and reversible. 
Therefore, the trial court's Order dismissing Mr. Henshaw's Complaint against 
Sweeney must be reverse and the case remanded for trial. 
POINTX 
MR. HENSHAW'S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST SWEENEY ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
In her Motion to Dismiss, Sweeney does not dispute Mr. Henshaw's 
assertions that she concealed from him the fact that she assigned the 
property to UDOT. In her Motion to Dismiss, Sweeney does not dispute the 
fact Mr. Henshaw only learned of her conveyance of the property to UDOT in 
March 1986. In her Motion to Dismiss, Sweeney does not dispute Mr. Henshaw's 
assertion that she lead him to believe that she would convey the property to 
him after she solved some unspecified problems on the property with UDOT. 
However, Sweeney argues that her concealment from Mr. Henshaw and misleading 
of Mr. Henshaw should not prevent her from availing herself of the defense of 
the statute of limitations. 
A. Mr. Henshaw was not required to file his complaint against Sweeney 
within whatever time remained under the six year statute of limitation after 
his discovery of Sweeneyfs breach of the Contract. 
Sweeney asserts that Mr. Henshaw learned of her breach of the Contract 
within the statute of limitations, yet failed to file a complaint within that 
time and therefore, he is estopped from relying on the discovery rule to toll 
the statute of limitations. Sweeney asserts that once a person learns of a 
breach of contract that party has only the time remaining under the statute 
of limitation to file a complaint; however, that assertion is not supported 
by any authority. Is Sweeney asserting that if a party conceals a breach 
until one day before the statute of limitations runs, the non-breaching party 
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has only one day to file an action? What if the breach is discovered one 
hour before the statute runs? What about one minute, or one second? Does 
the non-breaching party only have fifty-nine minutes to file a claim or 
fifty-nine seconds or whatever remains of the last second? 
The uncontroverted law in Utah is that the statute of limitations on a 
cause of action only begins to run when that cause of action is discovered or 
should have been discovered. Vincent v. Sale Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 
1978); Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). 
In this case, Mr. Henshaw first discovered Sweeney's breach of the Contract 
in March of 198 6, when UDOT informed him of the assignment of the Contract by 
Sweeney to UDOT. Mr. Henshaw filed his Complaint against Sweeney within six 
years of the time he learned of the breach. Therefore, the six-year statute 
of limitation on the written Contract had not run, and Mr. Henshaw's 
Complaint was timely. Contrary to Sweeney's assertion, Butcher v. Gilroy, 
744 P.2d 311, (Utah Ct. App. 1987) does not state, hold or mandate that if a 
party discovers a breach before the statute of limitation for the breach has 
run, the non-breaching party has only that time remaining under the statute 
of limitation to file a cause of action on the breach. 
B. Mr. Henshaw took appropriate and reasonable action to protect his 
rights in the property. 
Sweeney also claims that Mr. Henshaw is estopped to assert the benefit 
of the discovery rule because he failed to take reasonable action to protect 
his interest in the property. That assertion is simply not true. As the 
record shows, Mr. Henshaw hired at least three different attorney's to help 
him to resolve the problem with the property, after he learned of Sweeney's 
assignment of the property to UDOT. (Record at 465-492) The record also 
establishes that Mr. Henshaw continually tried to resolve the purchase of the 
property with Sweeney, and the record clearly shows that Mr. Henshaw filed 
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his Complaint against Sweeney and UDOT within the applicable statute of 
limitations- (Record at 465-492) 
Sweeney asserts that Mr. Henshaw "apparently made no investigation of 
the records although he claims to have filed the Contract there." (Sweeney's 
Brief, page 19). Apparently neither UDOT nor Sweeney ever bothered checking 
the records either. UDOT claims it did not know of Brady's interest in the 
property until 1991, yet it sold the property to Sweeney and held the 
assignment from Sweeney from 1985 through 1991. Sweeney owned the property 
from 1973 or earlier, yet she did not attempt to protect her interest in the 
property or, as now she asserts, she was unable to ascertain that she did not 
have clear title to the property until sometime between July and October 
1985. 
Because of Sweeney's continued assertions that she was working to 
resolve the unspecified problem with the property, because of her continued 
assertions that she would consummate the Contract with Mr. Henshaw and 
because Mr. Henshaw had previously had three separate title reports prepared 
on the property, Mr. Henshaw was under no duty to check the county recorder's 
office to see if Sweeney had conveyed the property to someone else during the 
time he was negotiating with her for a pay-off of the property. It is an 
extremely hypocritical and disingenuous assertion by Sweeney to claim that 
Mr. Henshaw had a duty to check the county recorder's office to see if she 
were defrauding him or breaching the Contract with him. Sweeney cannot claim 
that Mr. Henshaw's failure to check the county recorder's records for a three 
month period to see if she had conveyed title to the property to someone 
other then Mr. Henshaw justifies her concealment of her assignment to UDOT 
and precludes Mr. Henshaw from relying on the discovery rule to toll the 
statute of limitations until Mr. Henshaw learned of Sweeney's breach. 
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C. The Application of the Statute of Limitations to Mr. Henshaw's Complaint 
is unjust. 
In this matter, Mr. Henshaw fulfilled all of his obligations under the 
Contract. Mr. Henshaw justifiably and reasonably relied on the 
representations and assertions of Sweeney that she was working to resolve 
some unspecified problem on the property. In good faith, Mr. Henshaw 
attempted to negotiate a final pay-off of the Contract with Sweeney. In an 
attempt to settle the matter, he hired three different attorneys to help him. 
For nine years he paid Sweeney the payments due under the Contract. For 
nearly six years, he attempted to resolve the matter with UDOT. 
First Sweeney deceived Mr. Henshaw about the status of the property and 
her assignment of the Contract to UDOT; then, UDOT attempted to defraud Mr. 
Henshaw into taking a quit claim deed to the property when UDOT knew the 
property was encumbered by Brady's claim. Under the facts of this case, it 
would be manifestly unjust for either Sweeney or UDOT to avail themselves of 
the defense of the statute of limitations. Therefore, under the holding of 
Meyers v. McDonald, supra, there are exceptional circumstances present in 
this case which preclude Sweeney and UDOT from asserting the Statute of 
Limitations as a defense to Mr. Henshaw's Complaint. Mr. Henshaw is clearly 
entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule with respect to the statute of 
limitations. Therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded that Mr. 
Henshaw's causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. That 
error is prejudicial and reversible. Consequently, the trial court's Order 
dismissing Mr. Henshaw's Complaint again Sweeney must be reverse and the case 
remanded for trial. 
V 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error when it 
granted UDOT'S Motion for Summary Judgment and when it granted Sweeney's 
Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment 
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and Motion to Dismiss must be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Henshaw respectfully request that the Summary Judgment 
and Motion to Dismiss entered by the trial court be reversed and this matter 
be remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 
. i')A 
Dated this / / day of May 1995. 
Charles A7"Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
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